Making an Example: Signalling Threat in the Evolution of Cooperation by Cimpeanu, Theodor & Han, The Anh
Making an Example: Signalling Threat in the
Evolution of Cooperation
Theodor Cimpeanu
School of Computing, Engineering & Digital Technologies
Teesside University
Middlesbrough, UK
T.Cimpeanu@tees.ac.uk
The Anh Han
School of Computing, Engineering & Digital Technologies
Teesside University
Middlesbrough, UK
T.Han@tees.ac.uk
Abstract—Social punishment has been suggested as a key
approach to ensuring high levels of cooperation and norm
compliance in one-shot (i.e. non-repeated) interactions, however
it does not usually emerge if it is not also cost-efficient. Signalling
retribution hearkens back to medieval sovereignty, insofar as the
very word for gallows in French stems from the Latin word
for power and serves as a grim symbol of the ruthlessness of
high justice. Here, we introduce the mechanism of signalling an
act of punishment and a special type of defector emerges, one
who can recognise this signal and avoid punishment by way of
fear. We describe the analytical conditions under which threat
signalling can maintain high levels of cooperation. Moreover, we
perform extensive agent-based simulations so as to confirm and
expand our understanding of the external factors that influence
the success of social punishment. We show that our suggested
mechanism catalyses cooperation, even when signalling is costly
or when punishment would be impractical. We observe the
preventive nature of advertising retributive acts and we contend
that the resulting social prosperity is a desirable outcome in the
contexts of AI and multi-agent systems. To conclude, we argue
that fear acts as an effective stimulus to pro-social behaviour.
Index Terms—Emergent behaviour; Modelling for agent-based
simulation; Social simulation
I. INTRODUCTION
Punishment has been suggested as one of the most relevant
explanations to understanding how selfish individuals self-
organise and enforce cooperation or compliance to social
norms in various societies [16, 30, 6]. Numerous empiri-
cal studies show human proclivity towards punishing unjust
behaviour or violations of social norms, often at great cost
to their own selves [16, 12]. Although in modern societies,
sanctioning systems have been widely implemented in the
hopes of enforcing laws, many social norms continue to be
upheld by the effects of private sanctions [16]. Moreover, third-
party punishment has also been implemented in various online
systems, such as virtual agent societies [36] or vendor mar-
ketplaces [25], as a method of enhancing pro-social behaviour
and norms compliance, by both customers and sellers [25].
Cooperation often emerges under the influence of social
punishment (i.e. punishing wrongdoers) [11, 16, 18], but this
fails to explain how punishment evolves, especially if it is
costly to punish others. Indeed, it has been concluded that
punishment is often maladaptive within its respective games
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[14, 28, 41] and that punishment can only evolve if it is cost-
effective to do so (i.e. the offender suffers much more from
retribution compared to the aggrieved party) [14, 28, 41].
Refusing low offers in the ultimatum game (another form
of punishment) in the presence of observers, made the wilful
(punishers) more likely to receive higher offers in future
interactions [15]. The fear of having a low offer refused
increased the tendency to present higher offers to obstinate
individuals and this may help explain which mechanism(s)
allow the promotion of punishment when it is costly to do so.
In addition, pre-play signalling has been shown to open new
avenues for cooperation to emerge, even when such signals
are meaningless [35]. One area, to our knowledge, which has
not yet been explored is using signalling [23] to explain the
emergence of punishment as a viable strategy in evolutionary
games, whereby punishers make their retributive deeds well-
known in the population, as a deterrent to malefactors. Threat
of punishment has also been indicated as one form of mak-
ing credible commitments [26, 17], which becomes another
reasonable explanation to the dilemma of social punishment.
In this paper, we propose and analyse a novel approach
towards explaining the evolutionary advantage of punishers in
the context of anonymous interactions [37] (without relying
on reputation). We make use of evolutionary game theoretic
models [37] (see Section III) to show that signalling acts of
punishment can promote the emergence of cooperation in the
selfish environment of the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
[37]. This game is a popular underlying agent interaction
framework for studying self-regarding agents and it is also
the most difficult pairwise social dilemma for cooperation to
emerge in. Threat of punishment can reduce defection from
others without having to punish and we show that social wel-
fare in this regime is much higher than what traditional social
punishment models suggest (see Section IV-B). We provide a
comprehensive view of the outcomes of external factors, such
as cost of signalling or effectiveness of punishment, and we
show that expensive signalling can still provide meaningful
gains to cooperation when punishing others is costly.
The effect of threat of punishment by costly signalling may
provide key insights into policy making in the context of
distributed systems or artificial intelligence. Indeed, it has been
concluded that increasing the probability of developing super-
intelligent agents is incompatible with using safety methods
that incur delays or limit performance [5]. What is more,
when technological supremacy can be achieved in the short to
medium term, the significant advantage gained from underes-
timating or even ignoring ethical and safety precautions could
lead to serious negative consequences [1, 8]. A proposed solu-
tion to mitigating this dangerous behaviour is to look towards
intrinsic measures of encouraging AI research communities to
want to pursue safe, beneficial design methodology [3]. Our
results show that threat signalling may serve as one intrinsic
factor to prevent catastrophic consequences in that regard.
II. RELATED WORK
Punishment has been a major explanation for the evolution
of cooperation in the context of the one-shot interaction
[16, 12, 30] (for other explanations, see a survey in [37]).
A critical condition for cooperation to be sustainable in
evolutionary models [6, 20], as well as observable in lab
experiments, requires the punishment to be cost-efficient, i.e.
the effect it has on the wrongdoer should be sufficiently large
compared the cost issued towards the punisher.
Signalling within and between organisms has been inves-
tigated using game theoretic models in areas of biology,
economics and philosophy and it has been suggested that
certain qualitative aspects are common to many real-world
interactions [23]. Furthermore, it has been shown that sig-
nalling is a robust mechanism for promoting cooperative
action in certain collective quorums [29]. In the presence
of meaningless (no pre-defined meaning or behaviour) pre-
play signals, cooperation has been shown to emerge as a
result of individuals learning to discriminate between different
signals and reacting accordingly [35]. Pre-play signalling has
also been studied in the context of the evolution of honest
signalling, showing that honest signalling only emerges when
signalling is costly [7]. To the best of our knowledge, no
work so far has studied how signalling theory could explain
the prevalence of social punishment by advertising acts of
punishment after the fact.
Reputation has been suggested as an approach towards ad-
dressing this puzzle [13, 31], where agents’ actions consolidate
in the eyes of observers some assumption of future behaviour.
In this manner, social punishers can benefit indirectly through
maintaining a reputation of punishing unjust behaviour [21].
However, the assumption that agents’ actions are not anony-
mous proves unrealistic in many social contexts or application
domains [37], i.e. in very large societies or when observation
is difficult.
The simple presence of an audience has been shown
experimentally to increase human propensity for moralistic
punishment, causing an increase in costly punishment as a
response to perceived moral violations [24]. Participants did
not expect to encounter audience members again and the
results hold for anonymous interactions or when the only
observer was the experimenter. This suggests that there is at
least some type of benefit to increasing the observability of
one’s willingness to punish, beyond reputation. Participants
were generally not self-aware of the reasons for which they
decided to punish, so in the context of self-organised societies
[4], this would explain why some individuals act towards the
interests of society as a whole, irrespective of their intentions
to do so [38]. To this end, we are further motivated to study
inherent normative mechanisms that have developed as a result
of indirect evolutionary advantages.
Survey data on contribution norms in homogenous and
heterogeneous groups has demonstrated that uninvolved in-
dividuals hold well defined, yet conflicting normative views
on equality, equity and efficiency [34]. That being the case, it
has also been shown experimentally that punishment can help
groups overcome this collective action problem, through the
emergence of strong and stable contribution norms [34]. With
regard to self-organised systems, punishment may help self-
organising agents come to collective agreements on normative
standards for efficiency, equity and equality.
Finally, punishment and sanctioning have been studied
extensively in the multi-agent system (MAS) literature [40, 2].
Differently from our work, these studies aim at using the
cooperation enforcing power of the mechanism for the purpose
of regulating individual and collective behaviour, formalizing
different relevant aspects of these mechanisms (such as norms
and conventions) in a MAS. Moreover, to the best of our
knowledge, no work exists in the literature that analyses how
sending costly threat of punishment can improve cooperation.
As we show later, this mechanism can significantly enhance
cooperation even when punishment is not highly cost efficient.
III. MODELS AND METHODS
We adapt the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), first by integrating
the option of costly punishment as a benchmark and we follow
by describing the main model and the different configurations,
which we explore using replicator dynamics and simulations.
By choosing the most competitive social dilemma [22], we
explore the toughest environment for the emergence of co-
operation, therefore increasing the relevance of any observed
effects.
A. Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
The one-shot PD is characterised by the following payoff
matrix:
C D( )
C R S
D T P
.
Players experience, in pairs, a cooperation dilemma. In an
interaction, individuals can decide whether to cooperate (play
C) or defect (play D). Mutual cooperation (mutual defection)
yields the reward R (penalty P ), whereas unilateral defection
provides a defector with the temptation T and the cooperator
with the sucker’s payoff S (T > R > P > S) [37]. The game
is considered one-shot, in other words there is no memory of
past actions or prior knowledge about the interaction. We note
that an act of cooperation, i.e. playing C is different from a
player adopting the strategy C. For the latter, a player will
always play C and this is likewise true for acts of defection
and D players.
B. Social Punishment without Threat
We extend the PD by allowing a special type of C player
the option of costly punishment, thereby becoming a punisher
(P). After the normal interaction has taken place, a P player
chooses to punish those opponents who played D during the
interaction. A punishment act consists in paying a cost p to
make their opponents incur a penalty q. Contrary to previous
work that focuses mostly on efficient punishment [32, 6], we
include the case where p > q, in order to better understand
whether and when highly costly or inefficient punishment
can still act as a promoting mechanism of cooperation. The
newly defined P strategy always cooperates with C (as well as
other P) players and always punishes D players. By including
this strategy, we can analyse the evolutionary dynamics of
punishment strategies and their viability in the evolution of
cooperation. The 3 × 3 payoff matrix for the strategies P, D
and C (for row player), is given by:
P D C( )P R S − p R
D T − q P T
C R S R
.
C. Social Punishment with Threat
We extend the standard social punishment model by intro-
ducing signalling an act of punishment and responding to such
signals. Firstly, we consider a new type of punisher (denoted
by PT) who, upon punishing a defector, can advertise this act
by paying a cost θ, thereby alerting future opponents to their
willingness to punish (and to the consequences of defecting
against them). As such, a new type of defector arises (denoted
by DT), who, upon recognising the signal that denotes the
threat of being punished, will react and thus cooperate with
the signalling punishers (to avoid punishment). PTs cooperate
with each other, whereas DTs defect against each other, in a
similar fashion to P against D players. For infinite populations,
we can derive the 4 × 4 payoff matrix for PT, D, DT and C
(for row player) as follows:
PT D DT C

PT R S − p− θ R R
D T − q P P T
DT R P P T
C R S S R
.
In order to derive the payoff matrix for infinite populations,
notice that we can disregard the initial encounter between a
PT player and either type of defector. Given some probability
dependent on the composition of the population, the PT player
can enact a punishment upon a DT player. We explain this
interaction in-depth in Section III-D2 and provide average
payoffs in the case of finite populations (the above payoff
matrix for infinite populations can then be recovered at the
limit of increasing the population size to infinity). As this
population is infinitely large, the infinitesimally small initial
interaction can be safely omitted for the sake of simplification.
D. Methods
All the analysis and numerical results in this paper are
obtained using evolutionary game theoretic methods, using
replicator dynamics for infinite populations [22] and agent-
based simulation for finite populations [37, 27]. In this setting,
the payoff for each agent represents their fitness or social
success. Evolutionary dynamics are then shaped by social
learning [37, 22], whereby the most successful individuals tend
to be imitated more often by others.
1) Replicator Dynamics: Replicator dynamics are used
to study the growth of each fraction (of strategies) in the
population, as a function of their frequency and relative fitness,
where the fitness in this case corresponds to their payoffs
[37, 22]. If we consider a triple strategy game with PT, D
and DT, we denote xPT , xD and xDT the fraction of each
strategy, respectively. Therefore, xPT + xD + xDT = 1. The
average payoff (Π) for each strategy reads:
ΠPT = (1− xD) ∗R+ xD ∗ (S − p− θ),
ΠD = xPT ∗ (T − q) + (1− xPT ) ∗ P,
ΠDT = xPT ∗R+ (1− xPT ) ∗ P.
(1)
In order to calculate the relative fitness, we require the average
fitness (Π¯) in the population:
Π¯ = xP ∗ΠPT + xD ∗ΠD + xDT ∗ΠDT . (2)
We can then calculate the gradients of selection for each
strategy with the replicator equations:
x˙PT = xPT ∗ (ΠPT − Π¯),
x˙D = xD ∗ (ΠD − Π¯),
x˙DT = xDT ∗ (ΠDT − Π¯).
(3)
According to replicator dynamics, whenever a gradient is
positive (i.e. x˙ > 0), the frequency of that particular strategy
grows in the population. We can similarly extract the replicator
dynamics for P, D, C and PT, D, DT, C.
2) Agent-Based Simulations: For our simulations, we adopt
a population size N = 100 agents. At the beginning of the
game, each agent is randomly assigned a strategy from all the
available strategies for that experiment. We assume sequential
interactions between players (ordered encounters), which is
randomised at runtime. At each time step (generation), each
agent plays the PD with every other agent in the population.
The fitness for each agent is the sum of their payoffs from
each interaction.
Social learning is modelled using the pairwise compari-
son rule [39], a standard approach in studying evolutionary
dynamics in evolutionary game theory, which states that a
player A with fitness fA will imitate another player B with
fitness fB with a probability given by the Fermi function, i.e.
PA,B = (1+e
−β(fB−fA))−1, where β represents the intensity
of selection, i.e. how strongly the agents value the difference
in fitness between them and their opponents. For β = 0, we
obtain neutral drift (random decisions), whereas large values
of β lead to increasingly deterministic imitation. We assume
at most one imitation can happen per generation (asymmetric
update).
In the absence of exploration or mutations, evolution in-
evitably leads to monomorphic states. Once such a state has
been reached, it cannot be escaped solely through imitation.
Thus, we assume that, with a certain mutation probability µ, an
agent can randomly choose another strategy to adopt without
necessarily imitating an existing agent.
We simulate the evolutionary process for 104 generations
and average our measurements over the final 103 steps for a
clear and fair comparison (for example due to cyclic patterns).
Furthermore, the results for each combination of parameters
are obtained from averaging 500 independent realisations, with
the exception of typical run patterns. As we include mutations
in this work, it is important to note that no simulation reaches
a monomorphic state.
As the scenario we are exploring involves a well-mixed
population, we simplify the model using a statistical average
of the payoffs for each conditional strategy, as opposed to
carrying out the random ordering of interactions at the start of
each game. The average payoffs for social punishment without
threat remain the same as previously discussed in Section
III-D1.
To derive the average payoffs, we consider two distinct
sequences of events, for each agent acting out a conditional
strategy (PT and DT). Firstly, we consider the case when one
PT player encounters a D player at the start of the generation.
In this instance, the PT will punish the D player, while also
incurring the cost θ for signalling the act of punishment. Each
subsequent interaction with DT players will result in a reward
for both the players, as DTs will react to the signal and avoid
defecting against that PT player. Conversely, we consider how
the payoffs change when a PT player encounters a DT player
as the first defection against that PT in that generation. As the
PTs signal is unbeknownst to the DT, it will defect. In turn,
the PT will carry out their act of punishment, causing both
players to miss the opportunity of cooperating.
The probability of either sequence happening first is de-
pendent on the composition of the population at each first
interaction for PTs. The payoffs for all other strategies remain
unaffected. Let n1, n2 and n3 denote the numbers of PT ,
D and DT players in the population, respectively. We have
n1 +n2 +n3 = N . We denote ΠA,B the payoff received by a
player following the strategy A when facing players following
strategy B (some payoffs are equivalent e.g. ΠC,C = ΠPT,C =
ΠC,PT = ΠPT,PT = R). The average payoffs for PT, D and
DT read:
ΠPT =
1
N − 1
(
(n1 + n3 − 1) ∗ΠC,C + n2 ∗ΠPT,D+
n3 ∗ (ΠPT,D −ΠC,C)
n2 + n3
)
,
ΠD =
1
N − 1
(
n1 ∗ΠD,PT + (n2 + n3 − 1) ∗ΠD,D
)
,
ΠDT =
1
N − 1
(
n1 ∗ΠC,C + n3 ∗ (ΠD,PT −ΠC,C)
n2 + n3
+
(n2 + n3 − 1) ∗ΠD,D
)
.
(4)
Note that at the limit of infinite population size, N → ∞,
xP =
n1
N , xD =
n2
N , xDT =
n3
N , we recover the equations in
(1) for infinite population sizes.
For the four-strategy game (PT, D, DT, C), we introduce n4
as the number of C players. Therefore, we have n1 + n2 +
n3 +n4 = N . The payoffs for PT, D, DT and C then become:
ΠPT =
1
N − 1
(
(n1 + n3 + n4 − 1) ∗Π(C,C) + n2 ∗ΠPT,D+
n3 ∗ (ΠPT,D −ΠC,C)
n2 + n3
)
,
ΠD =
1
N − 1
(
n1 ∗ΠD,PT + (n2 + n3 − 1) ∗ΠD,D + n4 ∗ΠD,C
)
,
ΠDT =
1
N − 1
(
n1 ∗ΠC,C + n3 ∗ (ΠD,PT −ΠC,C)
n2 + n3
+
(n2 + n3 − 1) ∗ΠD,D + n4 ∗ΠD,C
)
,
ΠC =
1
N − 1
(
(n1 + n4 − 1) ∗ΠC,C + (n2 + n3) ∗ΠC,D
)
.
(5)
Note that the payoffs for unconditional strategies are never
affected by the ordering of interactions. Analytically, the
payoff for punishers who threaten depends on the number of
defectors who respond to threatening signals in the population,
specifically the ratio between the two different defecting
strategies (i.e. n3n2+n3 ). We contend that this could remain
true in practical scenarios. In other words, it is better for
signalling punishers when future defectors can discriminate
signals precisely, and this indirectly increases the payoff for
sensitive defectors, as well. This would suggest that there is
a synergistic relationship between signalling punishers and
fearful defectors and, to an extent, neither would prevail
without the other.
IV. RESULTS
We study the potential of punishment and signalling strate-
gies and their effects on evolutionary dynamics using three
aforementioned scenarios: no threat (P, D, C), threat without
cooperators (PT, D, DT) and threat with freely available
strategies (PT, D, DT, C).
A. Replicator Dynamics for Infinite Populations
Following our analysis on infinite populations, we find that
introducing threat signalling introduces a type of beneficial
dynamic which fosters cooperation. The relationship between
signalling punishers and defectors remains very similar to the
one found in standard social punishment models (see Figures
Fig. 1. Phase diagram comparison between standard social punishment (left
column) and social punishment with threat (right column) using replicator
dynamics. Vertices represent specific strategies, whereas solid and empty dots
stand for stable and unstable rest points, respectively. The colours represent
speed of motion under the dynamic (lighter is faster, darker is slower).
Parameters: T = 2; R = 1; P = 0; S = −1; p = 1; q = 3; θ = 1.
1a and 1c). Increasing the efficiency ratio of punishment (i.e.
q
p ) is the only way in which social punishment can remain
relevant and this can often lead to undesirable consequences.
On the other hand, the dynamic created between PTs and DTs
naturally promotes cooperation. DTs lose out to PTs, as DT
players do not cooperate amongst each other, but they do better
than their defecting brethren, by reaping the rewards of their
reluctance to defect against PTs. Even when the fraction of
cooperators (xP +xD) becomes very low, the existence of DTs
catalyses the conversion towards cooperation (see Figure 1b).
By increasing the efficiency in the case of threat signalling,
we found that the range of compositions which lead to all
defectors is reduced even further. The ratio q/p also favours
DTs over Ds, which can provide another avenue towards
cooperation that does not exist in the absence of signalling.
In Figure 1d, we show that the results remain robust when
we introduce C players, and in fact that the model is more
resilient to compositions with high xC compared to traditional
social punishment models, in which C outperforms P (when
p is high).
Analytically, we confirm the results from our replicator
dynamics analysis by computing the rest points for each
system of equations. For P, D, C, we found the following
stable rest point on the PC edge which we can see mirrored
in Figure 1a (at xP = 12 ):
{xP = P − S + p
R− S − T + P + p+ q , xD = 1− xP , xC = 0}.
Studying the case of PT, D, DT hints at the interesting
dynamics seen in Figure 1b. We observe the following edge
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Fig. 2. Typical evolution of frequency over time before (left column) and after
(right column) introducing signalling of threat. Note that we only address the
typical cases for clear comparisons. Parameters: T = 2; R = 1; P =
0; S = −1; µ = 0.001; β = 1.
rest points:
{xPT = P − S + p+ θ
R− S − T + P + p+ q + θ ,
xD =
R− T + q
R− S − T + P + p+ q + θ , xDT = 0},
{xPT = 0, xD = R− P
R− S + p+ θ , xDT =
P − S + p+ θ
R− S + p+ θ },
{xPT = 0, xDT = 1− xD}.
We add that for the parameter values seen in Figure 1, we
can observe a slight evolutionary advantage of PT against
standard defectors, compared to traditional social punishers.
For the same values of p and q, while also having to pay
a cost of signalling θ = p, we observe the points xP = 12
without signalling and xPT = 35 after signalling. This shows
that signalling social punishers have higher chances of survival
against wrongdoers, even if the aggregated costs they expend
towards punishment are larger than the ones paid by standard
punishers. Note that we only discuss edge rest points for clear
and concise presentation. Vertex rest points do exist in most
scenarios, and they can be clearly seen in Figure 1.
B. Agent-Based Simulations for Finite Populations
The initial results from the agent-based simulations confirm
the trend we found using replicator equations (see Figure 1).
For typical runs, DT outperforms D which leads to the rapid
extinction of D players and invites a booming growth of PTs
(see Figure 2). When q/p is low enough, we observed some
exceptions to the norm, in which the initial conditions led
to a population of predominantly DTs, which allowed PTs
to flourish which, in turn, led to further defection. This type
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Fig. 3. Effect of the efficiency ratio of punishment on frequency of coopera-
tion (punishers and cooperators alike) and average population payoff, before
(left column) and after (right column) introducing inexpensive signalling. Pa-
rameters: T = 2; R = 1; P = 0; S = −1; µ = 0.001; β = 1; θ = 0.01.
of cyclic behaviour only happened when punishing an act of
defection and/or signalling it were extremely costly. We note
that the results are robust even for costly signalling.
When signalling is not costly, we found that cooperation
is greatly increased across virtually all ranges of p and q.
In the case of simple social punishment, punishment is only
effective at increasing cooperation when it is also efficient
( qp > 3). On the other hand, even when punishment is very
inefficient, we find a high propensity for pro-social behaviour
in the presence of threat. Even when punishing is extremely
costly ( qp < 1), we observe close to 50% cooperation. At
moderate efficiency ( qp > 1.5), the frequency of cooperation is
very high (≈ 70%), comparable to highly efficient punishment
without threat. We confirm the trends for higher values of
θ (see Figures 2f and 4a), but also observe one interesting
outcome of signalling that may suggest a direct benefit towards
the evolutionary promotion of punishing behaviour. Even at
much higher ratios of efficiency of punishment ( qp ), it is
usually cooperators who prevail over the population, as seen
in Figure 2e. Conversely, fearful defectors only cooperate
with punishers, in the case of signalling, which naturally
promotes the evolutionary advantage of punishers (see Figure
2f). One valuable side effect of this phenomenon is that the
system is more resilient to mutation and exploration, a large
population of punishers is more able to deal with defectors
when compared to a large population of cooperators, where a
single defector acts akin to a wolf among lambs.
Welfare in the population (i.e. average population payoff)
was overall much higher in our extended social punishment
model (see Figures 3c, 3d, 4b and 4c). Of note, when punish-
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Fig. 4. How costly signalling influences cooperation for (PT, D, DT, C)
versus no threat (P, D, C). Figure a) shows the frequency of all cooperative
strategies for various values of θ and for the standard case. Panels b) and
c) show average payoffs as a function of efficiency of punishment and cost
of signalling for standard no threat (left) and threat (right). Parameters: T =
2; R = 1; P = 0; S = −1; µ = 0.001; β = 1; p = 1.
ment was very expensive (p > 2), average payoff decreases
dramatically in the extended model. Intuitively, this happens
because PTs survive by cooperating with Cs and DTs, but
also incur great costs in order to punish defectors and to
deter DTs from following that trend. For higher values of
q
p , we see another stark difference. With the exception of a
very small region of values, welfare decreases (Π¯ ≈ −25) as
cooperation goes up, whereas the opposite is true for signalling
(Π¯ ≈ 75). The power difference between Ps and Ds proves
damaging to social welfare - Ds do not cooperate, which
causes Ps to lose fitness and in return, they pay a further cost,
compounding the losses, causing Ds to incur even more loss.
While this behaviour fosters cooperation, it greatly decreases
social welfare. Inversely, a single act of punishment is enough
to convert the entire population of DTs to cooperation, which
is a qualifying factor in the growth of average payoff.
Our comprehensive study of the external factors under
which cooperation emerges, in regards to efficiency of punish-
ment and the cost of signalling shows that fear of punishment
enhances cooperation for almost all configurations (with the
notable exception of highly efficient punishment coupled with
expensive signalling). The results suggest that the transparency
of social punishment, specifically the awareness agents have
regarding acts of retribution, coupled with the ease of advertis-
ing said acts, behaves as a fulcrum towards cooperation. Fear
of punishment, therefore, is most effective when awareness
of who is or is not a punisher is high. On the other hand,
the more deleterious an act of punishment is, the more likely
it becomes for standard costly punishment to lead towards
satisfactory outcomes.
We also show that social welfare increases when signalling
is not very costly, irrespective of the punishment efficiency.
Interestingly, at higher θ values, social welfare lowers even
as cooperation increases. We show that when punishment
is effective, signalling can lead to lower levels of welfare.
Intuitively, this suggests that advertising an ineffective act of
punishment is productive even when signalling is expensive.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Punishment used as a deterring mechanism to prevent
further damaging actions against the punisher or their peers
appears to be a commonly found behaviour in human society
and even in some animal hierarchies [11]. Much of recent
literature has concluded, however, that punishment may have
evolved for reasons other than the promotion of cooperation,
because significant benefits to punishers could typically not be
found in the context of game theory [14, 33]. Indeed, it may be
the case that even if punishing defectors incurs an immediate
cost, it discourages observers from repeating said action, as
long as the accumulated costs of punishment are outweighed
by the additional acts of cooperation evoked over long runs
[13]. Our models suggest that this does not only happen in
repeated interactions and that punishment can evolve through
advertising the acts of punishment.
We show that signalling acts as a catalyst for the emergence
of cooperation when defectors are fearful of the punishers
who advertise themselves as such. Furthermore, we argue
that exhibiting deeds of punishment can explain the success
of punishers, when traditional social punishment mechanisms
would otherwise fail due to external factors, such as lowly
efficient acts of punishment. Indeed, it seems to be the
case that fearing punishment can discourage future defectors
even more than the evolutionary dynamics associated with
inexpensive, deleterious deeds of retribution. Moreover, we
show how the traditionally damaging effects of social punish-
ment upon social welfare can be mitigated by way of threat.
Because signalling punishers cooperate indiscriminately, they
outperform fearful defectors who are always vying for higher
status at the expense of others, including themselves.
The prosperity of the population observed under threat of
punishment speaks for the preventive nature of advertising
acts of justice. Undeniably, it is a beneficial outcome for
wicked ventures not to occur in the first place, but contexts
such as the development of AI or climate change provide us
with unparalleled incentive to prevent potentially disastrous
consequences. Given the importance of intrinsic factors that
guide the decisions of researchers and policy makers in the
field [3], we aim to explore further how the concept of threat,
and the self-preservation associated with it, could help guide
the current literature on this issue. Additionally, implementing
this type of signal response could improve safety conditions
in MA systems such as artificial societies [2, 40], especially
in cases where the transparency of interactions is reduced.
These observations raise important questions around the
coexistence of various types of punishers with different pro-
clivities to signalling, as well as thresholds under which they
decide that advertising their deeds of punishment would be
appropriate. Reciprocally, defectors could evolve to decide
when avoiding punishment is worth the act of justice and
which punishers they can exploit even as they signal their
propensity towards justice. Perhaps having a loud voice would
be more conducive to the emergence of cooperation than the
ease with which one can act revenge upon their enemies. Ana-
lytically, we have suggested the synergistic mutuality between
signalling punishers and fearful defectors. We reason that the
high sensitivity of defectors to signals of threat may allow
less expensive signalling, whereas lowly responsive defectors
require more obvious (and inherently costly) displays.
Future work on this topic will aim to include the full
breadth of strategies, including anti-social punishment and the
dynamics between normal and signalling punishers. This could
be exapnded to include memory-decay of threat (such as in
[9]), which would require constant reinforcement of the signal
for it to remain relevant. We are also interested in how sig-
nalling of punishment enables more cost-efficient cooperation-
enhancing interference mechanisms [19, 10], reducing costly
incentivisation. Assuredly, it would contribute to the breadth of
this research to study how network dynamics influence these
observations and whether this model for social punishment
is robust across a wide range of network topologies and
population structures.
REFERENCES
[1] Stuart Armstrong, Nick Bostrom, and Carl Shulman.
Racing to the precipice: a model of artificial intelligence
development. AI & SOCIETY, 08 2015.
[2] Tina Balke and Daniel Villatoro. Operationalization of
the Sanctioning Process in Utilitarian Artificial Societies,
pages 167–185. 01 2012.
[3] Seth Baum. On the promotion of safe and socially
beneficial artificial intelligence. AI & SOCIETY, 32, 09
2016.
[4] Je´re´my Boes and Fre´de´ric Migeon. Self-organizing
multi-agent systems for the control of complex systems.
Journal of Systems and Software, 134:12 – 28, 2017.
[5] Nick Bostrom. Strategic implications of openness in ai
development. Global Policy, 02 2017.
[6] Robert Boyd, Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, and Pe-
ter J. Richerson. The evolution of altruistic punishment.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 100(6):3531–3535, 2003.
[7] David Catteeuw, Bernard Manderick, and T. Anh Han.
Evolutionary stability of honest signaling in finite popu-
lations. In 2013 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Com-
putation, CEC 2013, pages 2864–2870, 2013.
[8] Stephen Cave and Sea´n S. O´hE´igeartaigh. An ai race for
strategic advantage: Rhetoric and risks. In Proceedings
of the 2018 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and
Society, pages 36–40, 2018.
[9] Raymond Chiong and Michael Kirley. Promotion of
cooperation in social dilemma games via generalised
indirect reciprocity. Connection Science, 27, 09 2015.
[10] Theodor Cimpeanu, The Anh Han, and Francisco C
Santos. Exogenous rewards for promoting cooperation
in scale-free networks. In ALIFE 2019, pages 316–323.
MIT Press, 2019.
[11] T.H. Clutton-Brock and Geoff Parker. Punishment in
animal societies. Nature, 373:209–16, 02 1995.
[12] Dominique JF De Quervain, Urs Fischbacher, Valerie
Treyer, Melanie Schellhammer, et al. The neural basis of
altruistic punishment. Science, 305(5688):1254, 2004.
[13] Miguel dos Santos, Daniel Rankin, and Claus Wedekind.
The evolution of punishment through reputation. Pro-
ceedings. Biological sciences / The Royal Society,
278:371–7, 02 2011.
[14] Anna Dreber, David G Rand, Drew Fudenberg, and
Martin A Nowak. Winners don’t punish. Nature,
452(7185):348–351, 2008.
[15] Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher. The nature of human
altruism. Nature, 425:785–91, 11 2003.
[16] Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter. Altruistic punishment in
humans. Nature, 415:137–140, 2002.
[17] T. A. Han, L. M. Pereira, and F. C. Santos. The emer-
gence of commitments and cooperation. In AAMAS’2012,
pages 559–566, 2012.
[18] The Anh Han. Emergence of social punishment and co-
operation through prior commitments. In Proceedings of
the Conference of the American Association of Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI’2016), pages 2494–2500, Phoenix,
Arizona, USA, 2016.
[19] The Anh Han and Long Tran-Thanh. Cost-effective
external interference for promoting the evolution of co-
operation. Scientific reports, 8(15997), 2018.
[20] C. Hauert, A. Traulsen, H. Brandt, M. A. Nowak, and
K. Sigmund. Via freedom to coercion: The emergence
of costly punishment. Science, 316:1905–1907, 2007.
[21] Christian Hilbe and Arne Traulsen. Emergence of
responsible sanctions without second order free riders,
antisocial punishment or spite. Scientific reports, 2(458),
2012.
[22] J Hofbauer and K Sigmund. Evolutionary Games and
Population Dynamics. Cambridge University Press,
1998.
[23] Simon Huttegger, Brian Skyrms, Pierre Tarre`s, and Elliott
Wagner. Some dynamics of signaling games. Proc Natl
Acad Sci U S A., 111(3):10873–10880, 2014.
[24] Robert Kurzban, Peter DeScioli, and Erin M. O’Brien.
Audience effects on moralistic punishment. 2007.
[25] Tomasz Michalak, Joanna Tyrowicz, Peter McBurney,
and Michael Wooldridge. Exogenous coalition formation
in the e-marketplace based on geographical proxim-
ity. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications,
8(4):203–223, 2009.
[26] Randolf M. Nesse. Natural selection and the capacity
for subjective commitment. In Randolf M. Nesse, editor,
Evolution and the capacity for commitment, pages 1–44.
New York: Russell Sage, 2001.
[27] M. A. Nowak, A. Sasaki, C. Taylor, and D. Fudenberg.
Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in
finite populations. Nature, 428:646–650, 2004.
[28] Hisashi Ohtsuki, Yoh Iwasa, and Martin A. Nowak.
Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of
efficiency for costly punishment. Nature, 457(7601):79–
82, 2009.
[29] Jorge M. Pacheco, Vı´tor V. Vasconcelos, Francisco C.
Santos, and Brian Skyrms. Co-evolutionary dynamics
of collective action with signaling for a quorum. PLOS
Computational Biology, 11(2):1–12, 02 2015.
[30] Simon T Powers, Daniel J Taylor, and Joanna J Bryson.
Punishment can promote defection in group-structured
populations. Journal of theoretical biology, 311:107–
116, 2012.
[31] Nichola J Raihani and Redouan Bshary. The reputation
of punishers. Trends in ecology & evolution, 30(2):98–
103, 2015.
[32] David G Rand, Joseph J Armao IV, Mayuko Nakamaru,
and Hisashi Ohtsuki. Anti-social punishment can prevent
the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation. Journal
of Theoretical Biology, 265(4):624–632, 2010.
[33] Daniel J Rankin, Miguel dos Santos, and Claus
Wedekind. The evolutionary significance of costly pun-
ishment is still to be demonstrated. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. USA, 106(50):E135 LP – E135, dec 2009.
[34] Ernesto Reuben and Arno Riedl. Enforcement of contri-
bution norms in public good games with heterogeneous
populations. Games and Economic Behavior, 77(1):122
– 137, 2013.
[35] Francisco C. Santos, Jorge M. Pacheco, and Brian
Skyrms. Co-evolution of pre-play signaling and coop-
eration. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 274(1):30 – 35,
2011.
[36] Bastin Tony Roy Savarimuthu, Maryam Purvis, Martin
Purvis, and Stephen Cranefield. Social norm emer-
gence in virtual agent societies. In Declarative Agent
Languages and Technologies VI, pages 18–28. Springer,
2009.
[37] Karl Sigmund. The Calculus of Selfishness. Princeton
University Press, 2010.
[38] John E. Stewart. Evolutionary possibilities: Can a society
be constrained so that “the good” self-organizes? World
Futures, 74(1):1–35, Oct 2017.
[39] A. Traulsen, M. A. Nowak, and J. M. Pacheco. Stochas-
tic dynamics of invasion and fixation. Phys. Rev. E,
74:11909, 2006.
[40] Daniel Villatoro, Giulia Andrighetto, Jordi Sabater-Mir,
and Rosaria Conte. Dynamic sanctioning for robust and
cost-efficient norm compliance. In IJCAI, volume 11,
pages 414–419, 2011.
[41] J J Wu, B Y Zhang, Z X Zhou, Q Q He, X D Zheng,
R Cressman, and Y Tao. Costly punishment does not
always increase cooperation. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A.,
106(41):17448–17451, 2009.
